George Orwell’s book, “Animal Farm” may be analagous to 1,500 noteholders trying to sort through all the issues in the Plan. ”Are Some Animals More Equal Than Others?”
“At the Meetings Snowball often won over the majority by his brilliant speeches, but Napoleon was better at canvassing support for himself in between times. He was especially successful with the sheep.”
The Officail Committee of Noteholders is backing the Plan. They will be sending you their endorsement letter. However some people are raising a questions about “conflict of interest” in the Committee backing a plan that for all inent and purpose gives up essentially the right to go after $120,000,000.00 in “claw back” recovery, favor a very small minority of noteholders who got out while the getting was good. What is being discussed is contained in page 25 of the Plan. 4th Amended Plan Settlement Alternative Triggered By Acceptance of the Plan (3) (c)
In exchange for the foregoing agreements, the REL Class 8 Claims shall be deemed Allowed under the Plan as follows:(a) for Noteholders in the amount set forth in the Debtors’ amended Schedules of Assets and Liabilities for each Noteholder, minus 50% of the cash paid to that Holder after the Exchange Transaction, but in no event in an amount less than zero, in final settlement of any Cause of Action that may exist to recover payments made after the Exchange Agreement to any Noteholder and/or to seek disallowance of any REL Class 8 Claim based on the existence of payments that are recoverable or avoidable as set forth in Bankruptcy Code § 502(d);
To analyize whether is a good deal for you or good for the noteholders as a whole you need to examine Exhibit B contained is Docket 779 Exhibits to 2nd Amended Disclosure I tried to get a discussion of this point started on the Bar-K Bolg at: http://barkinvestors.wordpress.com/2012/03/20/whats-the-latest/comment-page-2/#comments but it got lost in hue and cry trying to get the 4th Estate to take notice.
The four young pigs who had protested when Napoleon abolished the Meetings raised their voices timidly, but they were promptly silenced by a tremendous growling from the dogs. Then, as usual, the sheep broke into “Four legs good, two legs bad!” Chapter VI Animal Farm
So I thought I would republish here together with a submission from Attorney Robert Brower. A quick look at Exhibits to the Disclosure Statement raise a few questions.
- More than half of the Official Committee Noteholders got distributions after the exchange date.
- These distributions represented 3% of the funds distributed during that period, over 3 million dollars.
- There were 824 persons or accounts out of 3000 accounts that received distributions after the exchange date, 27% of the accounts got disbursements.
- These disbursements totaled 113 million dollars, about 17% of the entire fund.
- 308 people got disbursement between 100K$ and over 1 million dollars. This is equal to 10% of all people who got disbursements.
- 16 people got disbursement of over 1 million dollars. This is equal to .7% of all disbursements
- 22 people got disbursements from 500K$ to 1 million dollars. This is equal to .7% of all disbursements.
- 70 people got disbursement from 200K$ to 500K$. This is equal to 3.6% of all disbursements.
- 201 people got disbursements between 100K$-200K$. This is equal to 6.6% of all disbursements.
- How much will the formula in the Plan generate from these distributions.
- How will it effect me?
- If REL insolvent during this period is there a legal way to get all this money back into the pot other than the Plan?
- How much would it cost to get it back?
- What happened to the proposal that if they didn’t give it back they get nothing from the Bankruptcy? Did that disappear from earlier versions of the Plan? Why?
- Does that mean anything? Will the 5-10% you might get back in bankruptcy equal the amount you got disbursed after the exchange agreement?
Does this mean if you are in the 17% you made out? And if you’re in the .7% your really made out? But if you didn’t get a post-exchange distribution you are in the 83% that gives the 17% a pass? That’s not how it Special Master Picard did it in the Madoff case. What Were The Trade Off’s For Giving Up “Claw Back” Rights? Are Some Animals More Equal Than Others?

Committee & REL negotiations over “Claw Back” Provision
After I posted the information and numbered questions above Robert Brower sent his own analysis of Exhibit B, Docket 779 If you want to download and print Brower’s comments click here or read below: _Blog_post_Exhibit_B
SHERRATT RIECHER
After first posting Mr. Brower’s comments below, I did some more research on the creditors committee and found that Sherratt Riecher didn’t just get the $295,500.00 distribution as reported in Exhibit 3 Hugh Ray two compainies he controls MCG Investments and Dynamic Development according to Pages from Exhibits to 2nd Amended Disclosure higlighted MCG got $1,659,937.37 and Dynamic Development got $1,406,984.27. In total Sherratt Riecher got $3,362,421.64 !
ROBERT BROWER’S GUEST COMMENTS
I have read the May 17, 2012, Equitatus post concerning Exhibit B, the list of investors whose “net cash out” exceeded $10,000 after November 1, 2007. Equitatus used the information in Exhibit B without questioning the validity of that data.I decided to run a test to determine if the information stated in Exhibit B was accurate and reliable.
I have read the May 17, 2012, Equitatus post concerning Exhibit B, the list of investors whose “net cash out” exceeded $10,000 after November 1, 2007. Equitatus used the information in Exhibit B without questioning the validity of that data. I decided to run a test to determine if the information stated in Exhibit B was accurate and reliable.
For the test, I used a chart prepared by DSI to demonstrate that 6 out of the 10 voting members of the Committee had net cash out exceeding $10,000 after November 1, 2007. This chart is found at document No. 825, Exhibit 3. [The chart is is No. 825-4, page 2.] Exhibit 3 Hugh Ray On the DSI chart, the total net cash out to Committee members is stated as $3,355,019.40.
I felt that if DSI, with its extensive staff and knowledgeable experts, did not correctly interpret the data in Exhibit B, then it would be unlikely for any ordinary investor to draw a valid conclusion from Exhibit B in order to help that investor cast a vote “for” or “against” the plan.
My conclusion is this: the information presented in Exhibit B is not accurate and it is not reliable. It is also misleading.
Here are a few examples.
First, Exhibit B and the DSI chart reflect that Dixon Collins received net cash out of $157,292.11 from account COL040. This is false. The true facts are that Dixon Collins transferred the entire account balance of COL040, his trust account, to another account, his pension account COL041. He received no cash out and he is not subject to claw back. This mistake indicates to me that whoever prepared Exhibit B had faulty underlying data.
Second, there is a significant omission error concerning Gene Rapp, a preferred investor. The DSI chart has two net cash out accounts for Gene Rapp, RAP020 for $100,000 and RAP015 for $100,000. There is however one withdrawal not mentioned in either Exhibit B or the DSI chart. On January 22, 2008, Gene Rapp withdrew $670,000 from another account he controls, North American Financial, RAP025. This withdrawal was transferred as a deposit to B-4 Partners account, 00-007, as part of a $2,000,000 secured loan to B-4. The failure to include this Gene Rapp withdrawal on Exhibit B represents to me that whoever prepared Exhibit B did not understand that Gene Rapp’s withdrawal, even if he lent the $670,000 to B-4 Partners, would still be a net cash out for him and subject to claw back.
Third, there is a significant omission traceable to the Fong family of investments. Exhibit B and the DSI chart report $1,908,532.00 net cash out from Steve Fong’s account FON030. Exhibit B also reports Steve Fong’s brother, Tim Fong, has net cash out of $1,883,096. To validate those numbers, I had to confirm the net cash out for account FON016, Gifford and Vivian Fong. Exhibit B has the net cash out for that account as $881,818. That number is $1,000,000 short. The Fongs withdrew the additional $1,000,000 from FON016 on August 6, 2008. They immediately deposited it in Mortgage Fund ’08, account 08FON00, and withdrew $1,000,000 from MF ‘08 the same day.
I had heard about this scheme or trick before. If an R.E. Loans preferred investor wanted a certain amount money out of an R.E. Loans account, Walter Ng would recommend that he or she transfer that amount to MF ’08 and then immediately withdraw that amount from MF ’08. This skirted the Wells Fargo line of credit and the preferred “old” investor was paid with “new” investment money in MF ’08. The MF ’08 investor(s) never knew. Regardless, the failure to include this $1,000,000 withdrawal on Exhibit B represents to me that whoever prepared Exhibit B did not understand that a withdrawal, even if it was deposited into MF ’08 for payment from MF ‘08, would still be a net cash out and subject to claw back.
Fourth, Exhibit B and the DSI chart reflect that Edwin Blue received net cash out of $450,000 from account BLU015. The account record, however, shows 11 withdrawals of $50,000 totaling $550,000. $100,000 may not mean much in the greater scheme of things but the error reflects on the failure of Exhibit B to accurately depict the correct amounts of the net cash out.
Fifth, Exhibit B and the DSI chart reflect that Sherratt Reicher received net cash out of $295,500 from account HUD010. Apparently DSI did not know that Sherratt Reicher is also the investor for account MCG030, MCG Investments and Holdings. For that account, Sherratt Reicher received $1,659,937.37 net cash out. This discovery proves that the information in Exhibit B is too simplified, making it difficult to see related entities and interconnected transactions.
My test revealed that Exhibit B has significant errors, especially errors of omission. In addition, the information provided in Exhibit B lacks enough detail to be meaningful. Collectively, Exhibit B is not accurate, not reliable and misleading.
Finally, the DSI estimate of the Committee’s financial interest in the claw back issue ($3,355,000) is too low. The correct value is closer to $10,000,000.

REL, Macinack & the Official Noteholders Committee Want Your Vote!
If REL and the Committee made such an error as to just the Committee Members how can you trust the rest of Exhibit B? Lets go back into the records we have and show how the 00.7% Ran Away With Your Money.
If you are following the discussion on the Bar-K blog you would have see Attorney Robert Brower’s postings one of which is set forth below:
“I am an attorney licensed to practice law in California. I represent several R.E. Loans and Mortgage Fund ’08 investors. I am familiar with the operation of R.E. Loans and Mortgage Fund ’08. I have reconstructed the Ponzi-like transactions between the two funds. I have read the proposed plan of reorganization and the accompanying documents. I have tested Exhibit B, the net cash out transfers after the Exchange Agreement, and determined that, in my opinion, it is not accurate, not reliable and misleading. In my judgment, based upon all of the above, the proposed plan of reorganization does not provide investors in the two funds treatment consistent with their legal entitlement.
I further believe that rejection of the proposed plan would most likely lead to a result more favorable to the investors as a whole. I am therefore urging all of my clients to reject the proposed plan.”